This study explores developmental changes in the ability to ask informative questions, hypothesizing a link between the ability to update beliefs in light of evidence and the ability to ask informative questions. Five-to ten-year-old children played an iPad game asking them to identify a hidden insect. Learners could either ask about individual insects, or make a series of feature queries (e.g., ''Does the hidden insect have antenna?") that could more efficiently narrow the hypothesis space. Critically, the task display either helped children integrate evidence with the hypothesis space or required them to perform this operation themselves. Our prediction was that assisting children with belief updating would help them formulate more informative queries. This assistance improved some aspects of children's active inquiry behavior; however, despite making some updating mistakes, children required to update their own beliefs asked questions that were more context-sensitive and thus informative. The results show how making a task more difficult can improve some aspects of children's active inquiry skills, thus illustrating a type of ''desirable difficulty" for reasoning.
Introduction
A skill of central importance during development is learning how to ask informative questions in order to make sense of the world. The roots of these abilities are observable even in the early preschool years. For example, in simple causal reasoning tasks, preschool-aged children can distinguish confounded from unconfounded evidence to draw causal inferences (Gopnik, Sobel, Schulz, & Glymour, 2001; Kushnir & Gopnik, 2005 , 2007 Schulz & Gopnik, 2004) . Preschool-aged children also selectively explore confounded evidence in their own exploratory play (Cook, Goodman, & Schulz, 2011; Gweon & Schulz, 2008; Schulz & Bonawitz, 2007) . Despite these early emerging abilities, many of the cognitive skills required for self-guided, active inquiry seem to follow protracted developmental trajectories. For example, in tasks designed to assess scientific reasoning abilities, children in the older elementary school years (ages 8-10) often have difficulty adopting systematic strategies, such as testing the effects of one variable at a time or selecting interventions that will lead to determinate evidence (Chen & Klahr, 1999) . Although children in the older elementary school years can be taught to engage in these strategies via direct instruction (Klahr & Nigam, 2004; Kuhn & Dean, 2005) , it is notable how difficult it is for them to discover and implement them on their own.
One reason for the difficulties children exhibit in these types of inquiry tasks may be that active inquiry depends on the coordination of a variety of component cognitive processes (Bonawitz & Griffiths, 2010; Coenen & Gureckis, 2015) . For example, according to one popular view (Klein, Moon, & Hoffman, 2006a , 2006b Russell, Stefik, Pirolli, & Card, 1993) , active inquiry unfolds as a sequence of mental steps (see Fig. 1 ). Learners must generate possible hypotheses to explain their environment. They then must engage in decision making to ask questions or gather additional information to decide which of these hypotheses is most likely. They then must understand the results of these inquiry behaviors and update their beliefs accordingly, and so on. The various stages of this loop closely mirror the process of scientific reasoning engaged by scientists (Klein et al., 2006a , Klein, Moon, & Hoffman, 2006b Russell et al., 1993) . Inefficiencies in any or all of these interrelated processes may serve as developmental limitations. For example, young learners may be able to search efficiently for information given a particular set of hypotheses but have trouble updating their beliefs correctly given new evidence. In this sense active inquiry behavior is like a bicycle: when all the http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2017.05.021 0010-0277/Ó 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
